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Recent news that MPs have collectively benefited from some £2 million of paid-for overseas 
trips[1] leads to interesting questions over power, influence and our democracy. By far the 
leading destination was Israel and the Palestinian territories, most commonly (but not 
exclusively) paid for by pressure groups such as Conservative Friends of Israel and Labour 
Friends of Israel. Large numbers also attended events in Europe, China the Middle East and 
the USA, in some cases paid for by the governments in question. 
From the perspective of Brexit, this raises interesting questions about the direction in which 
future UK policy is likely to move and how closely the political views of those with power 
mirror those of the country they represent. In this context, recent visits by Michael Gove, 
Sajid Javid and Boris Johnson to the American Enterprise Institute are particularly 
noteworthy given their influence over substantial sections of the governing Conservative 
Party. 
In the event that the UK fully leaves the EU’s Single Market (and, of course, a so-called “no-
deal” Brexit next March would do that by definition), it will be free to diverge from EU 
standards in a wide variety of areas. In spite of the rhetoric that these would merely be 
“different” from current EU standards, it is difficult to see how such a move would be 
anything other than a move towards an “American model” in which standards are set below 
their present level. 
Alongside a competitive environment in which taxes were reduced, it seems likely that this 
would also involve lower tariffs in exchange for standards that were commensurately lower 
than their present level. These would presumably be enforced via bilateral trade and 
investment treaties, following arbitration procedures similar to those currently in place in 
trade agreements between the US and many other partners. Needless to say, such 
procedures are typically significantly more opaque than the system of justice overseen by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Whether such a direction is desirable or not is, of course, open to question and 
interpretation. The more pressing issue is whether it accurately reflects the will of those 
who voted to leave the EU. Whilst “Leavers” are every bit as much of a disparate group as 
“Remainers”, recent research[2] does draw out some particular themes. Not least, many 
Leavers appear to be particularly concentrated in areas of the country that have been hard-
hit by de-industrialisation[3]. It is far from clear that groups in spaces that have been “left 
behind” by recent progress are likely to find a move towards an environment in which 
chlorinated chicken becomes widely available to be appealing. 
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Indeed, recent research has found that such areas are likely to be particularly exposed to 
any move away from trade with the EU[4]. Finally, any moves to jettison the EU’s 
“precautionary principle” are unlikely to find favour with an electorate used to unusually 
stringent standards around food, labelling, chemicals and many others. To conclude, whilst 
there is no indication of any wrongdoing on the part of MPs who have conducted recent 
paid-for visits to right wing US think-tanks, it is unclear whether the policies they support 
are, in fact, those the majority of the country believed they were voting for in 2016. 
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